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ATTORNEY FEE RECOVERY PURSUANT
TO CERCLA SECTION 107(a)(4)(B)
Since Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), the ex-
tent of private party liability has caused great confusion.2 Section
107(a) defines the scope of CERCLA liability and creates a cause of
action against "potentially responsible parties" (PRPs)3 for hazardous
substance4 response5 cost recovery. Section 107(a)(4)(B) specifically
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1988)).
2. See, e.g., Paul W. Heiring, Note, Private Cost Recovery Actions Under CERCLA,
69 MINN. L. REv. 1135, 1141 (1985) (explaining that "[a]Ithough courts agree that
CERCLA authorizes private cost recovery actions, they do not agree on the circum-
stances in which such actions are permissible"); Keith W. Holman, Note, Wickland Oil
Terminals v. Asarco and the 1986 Superfund Amendments: The Tide Turns on CER-
CLA's Private Right to Recover Hazardous Waste Response Costs, 17 ENVTL. L. 307,
307 (1987) (noting that "courts have struggled to interpret CERCLA's section 107(a),
which allows private parties to recover their hazardous site cleanup costs").
3. See infra note 44 and accompanying text for an explanation of PRPs.
4. A hazardous substance is
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B)
any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to
section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identi-
fied under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42
U.S.C.A. § 6921] (but not including any waste the regulation of which under the
Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq.] has been suspended by Act
of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E)
any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42
U.S.C.A. § 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mix-
ture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to section
2606 of title 15. The term does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any
fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazard-
ous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the
term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquified natural gas, or syn-
thetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
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provides a private cause of action to recover response costs. 6 Under
section 107(a)(4)(B), PRPs are liable for the "necessary costs of re-
sponse incurred by any other person consistent with the national con-
tingency plan' 7 (NCP).8 A recent issue facing courts with respect to
CERCLA response costs is whether attorney's fees are recoverable
under section 107(a)(4)(B).9
Section 107(a)(4)(B) does not specifically address which costs are
consistent with the NCP. 10 Similarly, the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) regulations within the NCP fail to clearly define the
scope of NCP consistency and do not discuss whether attorney's fees
are costs consistent with the NCP. Because neither Congress nor the
EPA has explicitly defined "consistent with the NCP,"1 courts have
discretion to decide on a case by case basis which response costs a pri-
vate party may recover.2 Courts disagree on whether to allow a pri-
vate party recovery of attorney fees pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B).13
Several courts have taken a liberal approach to CERCLA section
CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988).
5. See infra note 107 and accompanying text for the CERCLA definition of
"response."
6. See infra note 43 for an exhaustive list of cases holding that CERCLA section
107(a)(4)(B) creates a private cause of action for response cost recovery.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). This section states in pertinent part:(4) any person ... from which there is a release... of a hazardous substance, shall
be liable for -
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consis-
tent with the national contingency plan.
Id.
8. See infra note 47 for an explanation of the NCP.
9. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text for an elaboration on courts' anal-
yses and holdings concerning attorney's fees as recoverable response costs under section
107(a)(4)(B).
10. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text for the CERCLA definition of
"costs."
11. See 55 Fed. Reg. 8858 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(i))
(defining "consistent with the NCP" merely as an "action, when evaluated as a whole,
[that] is in substantial compliance with the applicable requirements.., of this section,
and results in a CERCLA-quality clean-up").
12. See 55 Fed. Reg. 8794 (1990) (stating that the EPA's list of NCP consistencies
does not eliminate the courts' role in choosing which costs should be awarded to private
parties engaging in cleanup). See infra note 61.
13. See infra note 98 for a list of cases in which courts allowed private party attor-
ney fee recovery pursuant to CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B) and note 100 for a list of




107(a)(4)(B), relying on the spirit and objectives of CERCLA to hold
that attorney's fees are recoverable.1 4 These courts rely on the plain
language of 107(a)(4)(B) to justify attorney's fees awards.15 Courts re-
fusing to allow attorney's fees under this section, however, abide by the
American Rule which generally denies attorney fee awards absent an
enforceable contract or statute.
16
This Note argues in favor of awarding attorney's fees in private
causes of action under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B). Part I examines
CERCLA's history, purposes, and interpretation. Part II outlines the
various causes of action under CERCLA, with particular focus on the
private cause of action. Part III discusses the development and histori-
cal policies of fee shifting. Part IV analyzes cases addressing attorney
fee awards under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B). Part V concludes
that awarding attorney's fees pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B) is consis-
tent with both the American Rule and the purposes underlying
CERCLA.
I. CERCLA: ITS HISTORY, PURPOSES, AND INTERPRETATION
At the close of its ninety-sixth session, 7 Congress passed the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
14. See infra note Ill and accompanying text for a discussion of how the awarding
of private party attorney's fees is consistent with the purposes underlying CERCLA.
15. See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals' view that the plain language of section 107(a)(4)(B) allows for
private party attorney's fee recovery.
16. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 257, 270
(1975) (defining the American Rule, but refusing to assess its value). See infra notes 78-
81 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of decisions rejecting private party
attorney's fees due to the impact of the American Rule.
17. See Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D.
Fla. 1984) (detailing the promulgation and evolution of CERCLA during the 96th ses-
sion); Michael Dore, The Standard of Civil Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal Ac-
tivity: Some Quirks of Superfund, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 260, 267-68 (1981) (same);
Jeffrey M. Gaba, Recovering Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs: The Private Cause of Ac-
tion Under CERCLA, 13 ECOLogY L.Q. 181, 184 n.6 (1986) (discussing the 96th Con-
gress' attempt to pass a hazardous substance management regulation prior to the
Reagan administration). See generally Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of
1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982) (elaborating on CERCLA's legislative history);
Robert C. Eckhardt, The Unfinished Business of Hazardous Waste Control, 33 BAYLOR
L. REV. 253 (1981) (same).
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of 1980 (CERCLA). i s After the Love Canal disaster, Congress was
well aware of the severe dangers arising from hazardous substances. 9
Consequently, a sense of urgency surrounded the congressional debate
regarding CERCLA.2 ° CERCLA's legislative history is unclear, most
likely as a result of its quick passage and unexplained political com-
promises.1 The available legislative history indicates that CERCLA
was necessary because its predecessor, the Resource Conservation Re-
covery Act of 1976 (RCRA),2 2 failed to adequately respond to inactive
and abandoned hazardous substance sites.23 RCRA's major flaw was
18. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1988)).
19. See, e.g., Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441
(S.D. Fla. 1984) (explaining that the Love Canal disaster prompted Congress to pass
CERCLA as the end of the ninety-sixth session drew near); United States v. Northeast-
ern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 835 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (highlighting Con-
gress' awareness of Love Canal and other inactive hazardous waste sights prior to
CERCLA's enactment), rev'd in part, 810 F. 2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 848 (1987); Homart Dev. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1357, 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (stating that Congress enacted CERCLA "to respond to an
immediate and serious national concern which [was] epitomized by the Love Canal
episode"). For an in-depth discussion of the Love Canal tragedy, see ADELINE LE-
VINE, LOVE CANAL: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND PEOPLE (1982).
20. See, eg., 126 CONG. REc. 530945 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen.
Danforth) "[W]e have no time to lose. Hazardous wastes are produced daily; we cannot
put them on hold while we daily through deliberations." In addition, Senator Dole
stated that "[tihere can be no question about the urgent need to deal with hazardous
waste sites.... Federal action is needed to protect present and future generations from
the dangers to health and safety that Love Canal has come to typify for many Ameri-
cans." Id. at 30950.
21. Bulk, 589 F. Supp. at 1441 (stating that "CERCLA's legislative history is rid-
dled with uncertainty because lawmakers hastily drafted the bill, and because last min-
ute compromises forced changes that went largely unexplained"). See also Walls v.
Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985) (pointing out that "the legisla-
tive history of CERCLA is vague, reflecting the compromise nature of the legislation
eventually enacted"); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135,
1142 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (explaining that Congress passed "a severely diminished piece of
compromise legislation from which a number of significant features were deleted"). For
a comprehensive discussion of CERCLA's legislative history, see generally Grad, supra
note 17, at I (detailing CERCLA's legislative history).
22. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6992 (1988)).
23. United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 839
(W.D. Mo. 1984) (explaining RCRA's inadequacies with respect to inactive sites), rev'd
in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). See also Dore,
supra note 17, at 264-67 (discussing RCRA's monitoring and enforcement gaps which
helped initiate CERCLA's enactment). For a further discussion of RCRA, see gener-
ally RICHARD C. FORTUNA & DAVID J. LENNETr, HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION
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that it only regulated on-going disposal sites2" and failed to fully regu-
late all sites which were no longer in operation.2" RCRA's deficiency
2 6
prompted Congress to enact a comprehensive regulatory policy manag-
ing hazardous substances27 and to provide a means for quick cleanup
of existing inactive hazardous substance sites.28
CERCLA's enactment effectuated the need to clean up dormant sites
and provided financing to recover hazardous substance cleanup costs.2 9
"Superfund" established a $1.6 billion fund to grant financial assist-
ance for governmental and private cleanups.3 0 The governmental and
private response options enabled CERCLA to become an effective
THE NEW ErtA: AN ANALYSIS AND GUIDE TO RCRA AND THE 1984 AMENDMENTS
(1987) (comprehensively analyzing RCRA's scope).
24. See Dore, supra note 17, at 264-65 (explaining that RCRA provisions cover
"safe handling of hazardous wastes from generation to disposal").
25. Id. at 266-67. The author explains that although some of RCRA's requirements
may apply to abandoned hazardous substance disposal situations, RCRA's important
requirements do not apply in those situations. RCRA's "permit and notification re-
quirements" did not apply to abandoned hazardous substance sites "and discovery of
the source of environmental problems remain[ed] just as difficult as it [had been] prior
to RCRA's enactment." Id.
26. The failure of RCRA to address inactive hazardous waste sites is primarily due
to its purpose as a "cradle-to-grave" regulatory scheme controlling the movement of
hazardous substance from initial production to disposal. Id. at 264 & n.35. RCRA
regulates parties engaged in ongoing activities relating to the disposal of active hazard-
ous waste. Id. at 264-65. Parties leaving inactive abandoned hazardous waste, how-
ever, are not engaged in on-going activity and, therefore, are not subject to RCRA's
permit and notification requirements. Id. at 266-67. See also Joseph K. Brenner, Note,
Liability for Generators of Hazardous Waste: The Failure of Existing Enforcement
Mechanisms, 69 GEo. L.J. 1047, 1051-58 (outlining and criticizing RCRA's cradle-to-
grave management scheme).
27. Dore, supra note 17, at 267. The author points out that "Superfund was a
multi-faceted regulatory scheme designed to provide an independent basis for environ-
mental claims by both government and private parties." Id.
28. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (pointing out that CERCLA "is designed to achieve one key objective
- to facilitate the prompt cleanup of hazardous dumpsites"); Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc.
v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (same); CONG. REc. S30945
(daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen. Danforth) (imploring that "[W]e must clean
up abandoned hazardous waste sites as soon as possible"). See also supra note 20 dis-
cussing additional commentary on the urgent need to cleanup abandoned hazardous
waste sites.
29. See Brenner, supra note 26, at 1056 (acknowledging that CERCLA was enacted
to solve unaddressed hazardous waste problems and to finance cleanups).
30. Id. See Stepan, 544 F. Supp. at 1143 (stating that CERCLA was enacted to
finance governmental and private cleanups); Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,
589 F. Supp. at 1442 (explaining that Superfund is financed through an excise tax on the
1992]
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means for combatting abandoned and inactive hazardous substances.3 '
Although Congress professed lofty objectives when enacting CER-
CLA, its written form is not a model of clarity.32 Because of its ambi-
guities, courts have read CERCLA liberally to effectuate its general
purposes.33 As CERCLA has matured, courts have been mindful of
the congressional intent to give the federal government an effective
means of combatting hazardous substance disposal problems promptly
and efficiently. 34 Furthermore, Congress clearly intended that the fi-
petroleum and chemical industries and the rest is financed through other general
revenues).
31. At least one commentator criticizes CERCLA arguing that it is a modified com-
promise bill which fails to provide for adequate private party relief and to direct a
proper standard of liability among PRPs. Brenner, supra note 26, at 1056-58. Courts,
Congress, and the EPA have answered many of this author's criticisms concerning
CERCLA's standard of liability. See infra note 35 for cases which place responsibility
on those private parties which acted in violation of CERCLA's mandate.
32. See, eg., Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648
(3d Cir. 1988) (stating that "CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision....
Problems of interpretation have arisen from the Act's use of inadequately defined terms,
a difficulty particularly apparent in the response cost area"); City of Philadelphia v.
Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (explaining CERCLA's
vagueness, lack of clarity, and compromising nature).
33. See, e.g., Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 823 F.2d 977, 981 (6th Cir. 1987)
(taking a liberal approach to CERCLA notification requirements); Wickland Oil Termi-
nals v. Asarco Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 1986) (liberally interpreting CERCLA
§ 107(a)(4)(B) to allow private party cleanups without previous government authoriza-
tion or involvement); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir.
1985) (refusing "to interpret section 9607(a) in any way that frustrates [CERCLA's]
goals, in the absence of a specific congressional intention otherwise"); Key Tronic Corp.
v. United States, 766 F. Supp. 865, 871 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (reading CERCLA liberally
to avoid frustrating its remedial purposes); United States v. Northernaire Plating Co.,
685 F. Supp. 1410, 1419 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (taking a liberal approach to governmental
"indirect" cost recovery), aff'd, 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989); Mayor and Bd. of Al-
derman v. Drew Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663, 668 (D.N.J. 1985) (finding that a
liberal construction of CERCLA is consistent with its purpose of waste cleanup);
United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Co., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982)
(noting that "CERCLA should be given a broad and liberal construction"). But see
United States v. Ottati & Goss, 694 F. Supp. 977, 995, 997 (D. N.H. 1988) (taking an
opposing view of Northernaire and disallowing government "indirect" cost recovery
because that recovery is contrary to the plain language of CERCLA); Bulk Distrib.
Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1446 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (taking the oppo-
site view of Wickland and requiring governmental approval of a cleanup plan despite
CERCLA's purpose to clean up hazardous waste sites quickly as well as effectively).
See infra note 41 for a discussion concerning government cost recovery under
CERCLA.
34. See Walls, 823 F.2d at 980 (noting that "Congress intended that the federal
government be immediately given the tools necessary for a prompt and efficient re-
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nancial burden fall on the parties responsible for causing dangers re-
lated to hazardous substance disposal.3 5 Courts should continue to
follow congressional guidelines when deciding evolving issues under
CERCLA.
II. CERCLA CAUSES OF ACTION
A. Government Hazardous Substance Site Cleanup
CERCLA Section 104 allows governmental authorities to clean up
sponse" to hazardous substance disposal problems (quoting United States v. Reilly Tar
& Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982)); Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584
F. Supp. 1425, 1428 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (recognizing CERCLA's key objective to assist
the federal government in promptly cleaning up hazardous waste sites); Reilly Tar, 546
F. Supp. at 1112 (same as Walls); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F.
Supp. 1335, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (same).
35. See, eg., Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp.
1269, 1276 (D. Del. 1987) (explaining that wherever possible "CERCLA places the
ultimate financial burden of toxic waste cleanup on those responsible for creating the
harmful conditions"), aff'd 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988); Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v.
Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (finding that payment by re-
sponsible third parties is important in achieving CERCLA's goals); United States v.
Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 848 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (explaining
that "the persons who bore the fruits of hazardous waste disposal also bear the costs of
cleaning it up"), rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987).
Once liability has been established courts have uniformly held responsible parties to a
strict liability standard. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032,
1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (explaining that Congress intended responsible parties to be strictly
liable under CERCLA); Northeastern Pharm., 579 F. Supp. at 844 (same); United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (holding that
although CERCLA does not include a liability provision, when two or more parties
combine to create a single indivisible harm, those parties are jointly and severally liable
for the entire harm). See also H.R. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.A.A.N. 2835, 2856 (citing the Chem-Dyne rule with approval).
For an in-depth analysis of CERCLA liability, see Grad, supra note 17, passim (dis-
cussing strict and joint and several liability in CERCLA); Note, Joint and Several Lia-
bility For Hazardous Waste Releases Under Superfund, 68 VA. L. REv. 1157 passim
(1982) (discussing the development of federal common law of joint and several liability
as applied in Superfund cases); Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1112 (noting that "Congress
intended that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons
bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created");
Stepan Chemical, 544 F. Supp. at 1143 (holding that CERCLA places the ultimate
financial burden on the party responsible for creating the dangerous conditions). See
also H.R. No. 1016, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1986), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6119 (stating that CERCLA was enacted "to provide for liability of persons re-
sponsible for releases of hazardous waste").
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hazardous substance sites.36 Whenever a hazardous substance release
or a "substantial threat" of a release occurs, the government may clean
up the site.37 After conducting a cleanup under section 104, the gov-
ernment may receive cleanup response38 cost payment from the
Superfund.3 9  The government then recompensates the Superfind
through an action pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(A) against the party
responsible for the hazardous substance site.' Courts have held that
costs such as Justice Department attorney's fees and related costs are
recoverable under section 107(a)(4)(A) after a section 104 cleanup
response.41
36. CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
37. CERCLA § 104(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1)(A) (1988). See also Gaba,
supra note 17, at 186-88 (explaining CERCLA's governmental cleanup options).
38. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text for the CERCLA definition of
"response."
39. CERCLA 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(1) (1988). See also Gaba, supra note
17, at 187-88 & n.14 (explaining governmental recovery of response costs from
Superfund).
40. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988). This provision
makes the party responsible for a hazardous substance site liable for:
all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government
or a State or Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan.
Id.
For a definition of "not inconsistent with the national contingency plan," see 55 Fed.
Reg. 8794 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 300.700(c)). See also Gaba, supra note 17,
at 187 (explaining government recompensation of Superfund through section
107(a)(4)(A) actions).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F. Supp. 1410, 1417,
1420 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (holding that plaintiffs could recover attorney's fees and other
"indirect costs" such as administrative Superfund costs incurred by the Department of
Justice and EPA), aff'd, 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Northeastern
Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 851 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (finding that "since the
plaintiff acted pursuant to section 104(a), the Court finds that under CERCLA, the
defendants are jointly and severally liable for, and the plaintiff is entitled to recover, all
litigation costs, including attorney's fees, incurred by plaintiff"), rev'd on other grounds,
810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). But see United States v.
Ottati & Goss, 694 F. Supp. 977, 995 (D.N.H. 1988) (holding that "indirect costs neces-
sary to operate the Superfund program cannot be attributed directly to [the defendants']
sites, and are therefore disallowed"). After an appeal, the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals remanded Ottati & Goss for an explanation of why the district court denied EPA
"indirect costs." See United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900 F.2d 429, 443-45 (1st
Cir. 1990).
Courts may award attorney's fees pursuant to a section 104 cleanup responses be-
cause of the language in section 104(b) allowing the government to undertake any legal
planning and recover any such enforcement costs. See CERCLA § 104(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(b)(1) (1988) which provides in pertinent part:
In addition, the President may undertake such planning, legal, fiscal, economic,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol42/iss1/17
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B. Private Cause of Action
Initially, courts were skeptical and refused to recognize a private
cause of action for cleanup cost recovery under section 107(a)(4)(B).42
Presently, courts consistently hold that section 107(a)(4)(B) creates a
private cause of action to recover cleanup costs. 43 Section 107(a) limits
engineering, architectural, and other studies or investigations as he may deem nec-
essary or appropriate to plan and direct response actions, to recover the costs
thereof, and to enforce the provisions of this chapter.
Id.
42. See, ag., Walls v. Waste Resources Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1039,
1042 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (finding that "Congress did not intend to create a private right
of action under CERCLA"). The Sixth Circuit later reversed this holding in Walls v.
Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985) (Walls I). The court in Walls I
stated that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' CERCLA claim because
CERCLA does create a private right of action. Id. at 318.
43. See, e.g., Cadillac Fairview/Califomia v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 693
(9th Cir. 1988) (finding that section 107(a)(4)(B) empowers private parties to seek re-
sponse cost recovery); Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 890 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding that "[s]ection 107(a)(2)(B) expressly creates a private cause of ac-
tion for damages"); NL Indus. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986) (same);
Walls II, 761 F.2d at 318 (holding that "[a]llowing a private action to recover response
costs from responsible parties under section [107(a)(4)(B)] is... consistent with both
the language of section [107(a)(4)(B)] and with the congressional purpose underlying
CERCLA"); Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of New Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348,
1356 (D. Del. 1985) (same as Cadillac/Fairiew); Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto
Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (same as Cadillac/Fairview); Jones v.
Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1428 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (observing that private parties
"have the right to sue under CERCLA's liability provision"); Homart Dev. Co. v. Beth-
lehem Steel Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1357, 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (finding that
there can be no question that section 9607(a) or (b) creates a private cause of action to
recover the cost of response incurred by any private party); Pinole Point Properties v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 289 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (determining that sec-
tion 107 provides for a private party cause of action); Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Reilly
Tar & Chem. Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2118, 2121 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (ruling
that section 107(a)'s plain language allows for a private cause of action for response cost
recovery); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 515, 517
(D. Mass. 1983) (allowing private parties to recover response costs from those responsi-
ble for the danger under section 107(a)); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544
F. Supp. 1135, 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that 107(a)(4)(B) allows private parties to
recover response costs from third parties responsible for the danger).
A private party desiring repayment for a hazardous substance cleanup has several
choices. First, he or she can seek cleanup cost reimbursement from the Superfund.
CERCLA § I l(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (a)(2) (1988). This section may be used to re-
cover cleanup costs so long as the responsible federal official approved and certified the
cleanup costs. Id. The costs must also result in effectuating the NCP. Id. See infra
notes 57-58 and accompanying text. See also Gaba, supra note 17, at 195-96 (explaining
the requirements for private party recovery from Superfund). After a party receives
compensation pursuant to CERCLA section 11 l(a)(2), the government can seek to re-
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the group of persons responsible for cleanup costs to PRPs who may be
liable for either governmental or private party cleanup costs.'
plenish the Superfund through a section 107(a)(4)(A) action. See supra note 40 and
accompanying text for an explanation of the government's power to recoup expenses
financed through Superfund. A private party may also choose to move directly against
the party responsible for the danger of any cleanup costs through a CERCLA section
107(a)(4)(B) action. CERCLA § 107(aX4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). See
also Heiring, supra note 2, at 1140-41 (explaining different methods of private party
recovery under CERCLA).
44. CERCLA §§ 107(a)(4)(A),(B), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A),(B) (1988).
Section 107(a) defines those persons covered and provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the de-
fenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such per-
son, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incur-
rence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Gov-
ernment or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contin-
gency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consis-
tent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from
such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under
section 9604(i) of this title.
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1988).
See also Gaba, supra note 17, at 188. The author explains that "[s]ection 107 of
CERCLA defines the group of people who are potentially liable for government and
private party cleanup costs." Available PRP defenses are listed in CERCLA section
107(b)(l)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1)-(4) (1988). These defenses include an act of God
and an act of war, as well as a limited third party defense. The proponent of the defense
must establish the defense by a preponderance of evidence. Id. For a detailed analysis
of private party liability and defenses under CERCLA, see generally, Cynthia S.
Korhonen & Mark W. Smith, Note, CERCLA Defendants: The Problem of Expanding
Liability and Diminishing Defenses, 31 WASH. U. J. URn. & CONTEMP. L. 289 (1987)
(discussing PRP liability and defenses under CERCLA).
Many courts have pierced the corporate veil to find corporate officers liable pursuant
to CERCLA section 107(a)(1) and (a)(3). See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty, 759
F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that corporate officers and shareholders may be
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Response costs are expenses to clean up hazardous substance sites.
CERCLA defines "response" to mean "remove, removal, remedy and
remedial action.""5 All costs for enforcement activities are also in-
cluded in the CERCLA definition of "response.",46  Section
107(a)(4)(B) allows private parties to recover any "necessary costs of
response" from responsible parties so long as the costs are "consistent
with the National Contingency Plan."4"
Instead of providing a clear definition of costs that are necessary and
consistent with the NCP,4" CERCLA section 105 requires the Presi-
liable as "operators" within the meaning of CERCLA section 107(a)(1) for response
costs); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 420 (W.D. Mo.
1985) (finding a corporate officer and majority stockholder personally liable under
§ 107(a)); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 848
(W.D. Mo. 1984) (finding "that a 'person' arranging for the disposal of hazardous sub-
stance [sic] should be given a liberal interpretation that may include both the employee
and corporation"), rev'd on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert denied,
484 U.S. 848 (1987). For a comprehensive discussion of veil piercing theories and CER-
CLA liability, see generally Elizabeth A. Noonan, Note, To Pierce or Not to Pierce?
When is the Question. Developing a Federal Rule of Decision For Piercing The Corporate
Veil Under CERCLA, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 733 (1990).
45. CERCLA § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988). See Diane M. Connolly,
Successor Landowner Suits For Recovery of Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs: CERCLA
Section 107(a)(4), 33 UCLA L. REV. 1737, 1753-54 (1986) (discussing "response costs"
under CERCLA and the actions required to assess and clean up hazardous waste sites
within the definition of "response").
46. CERCLA § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988). See infra notes 104-09 and
accompanying text for an example of a court's application of this rule.
47. A potentially responsible party (PRP) in a private party cause of action may be
liable for "any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan." CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). For a private party to recover response costs from a responsible
party, "the release of hazardous substances must have 'caused' the incurrence of the
costs." General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1417
(8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1390 (1991).
The complete unabbreviated title of the NCP is The National Oil and Hazardous
Substance Pollution Contingency Plan. The NCP is a set of EPA regulations "which
describe methods of responding to hazardous waste problems and set forth guidelines
for the appropriate roles of state and federal agencies and private parties." Walls v.
Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 n.5 (6th Cir. 1985). The NCP is located at 40
C.F.R. §§ 300-300.920 (1991).
48. When Congress enacted CERCLA, Congress intended to give specific guidance
to governmental authorities involved in hazardous substance cleanup efforts. See, e.g.,
Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (S.D. Fla. 1984)
(explaining congressional focus on governmental cleanups and the understandable "ill-
defined" nature of private party causes of action). See also Heiring, supra note 2, at
1142 (explaining that the EPA promulgated the NCP "to provide guidelines for govern-
ment response actions utilizing Superfund money"). The EPA gives minimal guidance
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dent to continually revise the NCP to effectuate CERCLA's pur-
poses.49 However, the President, through the EPA, has given little
guidance with respect to defining and limiting costs "consistent with
the NCP."
Without a clear definition of "consistent with the NCP," courts have
reached different conclusions about NCP consistency. ° Although
some courts have interpreted NCP consistency narrowly,51 most courts
have adopted a more liberal interpretation of section 107(a)(4)(B)'s
NCP consistency requirement. 52
Recently, the EPA has followed the liberal trend and interpreted
at 40 C.F.R. § 300.700 (1991), which applies to activities by other persons. See infra
notes 55-56 and accompanying text for an elaboration on what is consistent with the
NCP.
49. CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988). See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S.
355, 374 (1986) (explaining that CERCLA section 105 requires the President to regu-
larly revise the NCP). Section 105(a)(8)(B) requires the President to create a national
priorities list (NPL) of known hazardous substance disposal sites. Id. The current
NPL is located at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. B (1991). As of February, 1991, there were
1072 sites placed on the NPL. Id.
50. See Connolly, supra note 45, at 1759-62 (discussing courts' different conclusions
about what is consistent with the NCP).
51. See, eg., Bulk, 589 F. Supp. at 1444. The Bulk court held that the government
must authorize a cleanup plan prior to a private remedial measures and recovery law
suit pursuant to CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B). Id. The court expressed a fear of
shoddy cleanups and belief that government approval was necessary to ensure efficient
private party cleanup. Id. at 1446.
52. See, e.g., Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir.
1986). The Wickland court held that government approval of a cleanup plan is not
necessary prior to an action under CERCLA section 107. Id. The Wickland court
reasoned that response costs are consistent with the NCP "so long as the response meas-
ures promote the broader purposes of the plan." Id. at 891. For a comprehensive anal-
ysis of Wickland, see generally Holman, supra note 2 (explaining and applauding the
Wickland decision).
The 1985 NCP preamble makes it "absolutely clear that no Federal approval of any
kind is a prerequisite to a cost recovery under section 107." 50 Fed. Reg. 47,934 (1985).
See also Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. Atlas Properties, Inc., 901 F.2d 1206,
1208-09 (4th Cir. 1990) (agreeing that governmental approval of a cleanup action is not
necessary prior to private suit under CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B)); Wilshire Westwood As-
soc. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 810 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); Cadillac
Fairview/California v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1988) (same); Tan-
glewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1575 (5th Cir.
1988) (same); NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 899 (9th Cir. 1986) (same);
Allied Towing v. Great Eastern Petroleum Corp., 642 F. Supp. 1339, 1349 (E.D. Va.
1986) (same). For an in-depth analysis of whether prior government approval or in-
volvement is necessary pursuant to an action under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B), see
Gaba, supra note 17, at 201-05 and Heiring, supra note 2, at 1145-46.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol42/iss1/17
CERCLA ATTORNEY FEES
"consistent with the NCP" broadly.5 3 Prior to the 1991 NCP revision,
many commentators requested that the EPA clearly define and create a
list of specific costs within NCP consistency. 54 Other commentators
favored a broader, less restrictive definition of NCP consistency.5 5 The
EPA agreed with the latter group and explained that response costs are
"consistent with the NCP" if the response, when evaluated entirely,
substantially complies with applicable regulations5 6 and results in a
CERCLA-quality cleanup. 7 The EPA purposely defined "consistent
with the NCP" broadly in order to avoid strict compliance to a rigid
set of requirements for actions pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B).5 8 The
EPA's purposeful decision to define NCP consistency expansively ac-
cords with CERCLA's remedial purpose to quickly and effectively
eradicate hazardous substance sites.59 The EPA's broad interpretation
removes private party obstacles and aids in the achievement of prompt
hazardous substance site removal.' As a result, courts have full dis-
53. See 55 Fed. Reg. 8794 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)) (stating
that insubstantial deviations from the NCP should not defeat a cost recovery action).
54. See, eg., 55 Fed. Reg. at 8792. These commentators argued that a comprehen-
sive list of requirements that must be met pursuant to CERCLA § 107(a) action would
promote certainty for everyone involved in hazardous substance cleanup efforts. Id.
An EPA listing of costs "consistent with the NCP" would have permitted attorneys to
define precisely which response costs under section 107(a) comport with the EPA list.
Id.
55. Id These commentators were afraid that a procedural, definitive list would
discourage cleanups and frustrate CERCLA's purpose of prompt private party clean-
ups. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text for a further explanation of CER-
CLA policies.
56. The governing applicable regulations are found at 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.700 (1991).
Basically, these regulations establish that cleanup responses must be comprehensive,
cost-effective, and provide an opportunity for public comment concerning selection of
cleanup methods. Id.
57. 40 C.F.R. 300.700 (c)(3)(i) (1991). The EPA stated that the following require-
ments must be satisfied in order for a cleanup remedy to be a "CERCLA-quality
cleanup:" "[t]he remedial action must be 'protective of human health and the environ-
ment,' utilize 'permanent solutions and alternative treatment technologies or resource
recovery technologies to the maximum extent practicable,' and be 'cost-effective'...
and provide for meaningful public participation." 55 Fed. Reg. 8793 (1990). The stan-
dards for cleanups are located within CERCLA § 121, 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1988). Public
participation provisions are located at CERCLA § 117, 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (1988).
58. 55 Fed. Reg. at 8793. "[R]igid adherence to a detailed set of procedures should
not be required in order to recover costs under CERCLA for private party clean-ups."
Id.
59. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text for an explanation of CERCLA's
general purposes.
60. 55 Fed. Reg. at 8794-95. EPA believes "that it is an important public policy to
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cretion to decide whether and to what extent response costs are consis-
tent with the NCP for each individual case.6 1
Judicial and EPA interpretation of CERCLA's private cause of ac-
tion under section 107(a)(4)(B) indicates continuous recognition of
CERCLA's basic objectives. 62 Effective private response cost recovery
mechanisms are vital in combatting the dangers of hazardous sub-
stance disposal.63 Therefore, courts have recognized that CERCLA's
broad remedial purpose"4 promotes hazardous substance remedies in-
dependent of governmentally funded Superfund remedies. 65 In addi-
tion, an efficient private cause of action mechanism saves the
government time and finances which otherwise would be expended on
Superfund claims pursuant to CERCLA section 11 l(a)(2).66 This lib-
encourage private parties to voluntarily clean up sites, and to remove unnecessary ob-
stacles to their recovery of costs" from the parties that are liable for the contamination.
Id. at 8794.
61. Id. "[Tlhe final rule provides a standard against which to measure 'consistency
with the NCP,' but does not eliminate the very important role of courts in deciding, on
a case-specific basis, what costs should be awarded to the party that has undertaken the
clean-up." Id.
62. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress' in-
tentions in promulgating CERCLA.
63. This author asserts that liberal applications of CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B)
make it easier to recover cleanup costs from the party responsible for emitting the haz-
ardous substance. More lenient recovery standards could serve as an effective deterrent
against improper hazardous substance disposal. See infra notes 161-62 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of the effects of awarding costs to private parties bringing suit
pursuant to CERCLA.
64. See supra note 33 and accompanying text for a list of cases finding that CER-
CLA should be broadly interpreted by the judiciary.
65. See, e.g., Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir.
1986). The Wickland court recognized "CERLA's broad remedial purpose" and acted
in a way to promote "the effectiveness of private enforcement actions under section
107(a) as a remedy independent of governmental actions financed by Superfund." Id.
See also Cadillac Fairview/California v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.
1988) (same as Wickland). But see Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F.
Supp. 1437, 1446 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (construing CERCLA narrowly to require govern-
ment approval of a cleanup action prior to recovery under 107(a)(4)(B)). See supra note
51 for a discussion of the Bulk court's construction of CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B).
66. See Bulk, 589 F. Supp. at 1444 (recognizing that the $1.6 billion Superfund
reservoir is not limitless). The Bulk court touched on an important idea. If there is a
weak private party cause of action under CERCLA, more parties will need Superfund
financing to reimburse cleanup costs under CERCLA § 11 l(a)(2). The government
then must reimburse the Superfund through 107(a)(2)(A) actions against responsible
parties. Instead of keeping funds in the Superfund treasury, funds would be paid out,
forcing the government to seek recovery on its own.
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eral reading of section 107(a)(4)(B) further promotes Congress' reme-
dial purpose underlying CERCLA and helps the government maintain
control of Superfund monies.67
III. FEE SHIFTING
A. The English Rule
English courts have awarded attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs
for centuries,6" while successful defendants have received awards since
1607.69 After the parties litigate their substantive claims, a separate
hearing determines cost allocation, including attorney's fees.70 The
theory underlying the English Rule is that, but for another's wrongful
conduct, the prevailing party would have no reason to endure trouble-
some litigation.71 A successful party receives complete compensation
under the English Rule.72 The end result of English Rule fee shifting is
total compensation to the victor through the loser's complete
67. See Bulk, 589 F. Supp. at 1444 (stating that private actions are necessary to
clean up "sites beyond the reach of Fund-sponsored actions").
68. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1973)
(noting that in England, "counsel fees are regularly allowed to the prevailing party").
See also Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 852 (1929) (explaining that the
first English Law giving a plaintiff attorney's fees was the Statute of Gloucester (1275));
Joseph H. King, Jr. & Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Right to Counsel Fees In Public Interest
Environmental Litigation, 41 TENN. L. REv. 27, 31-32 (1973) (same); Scott J. Jordan,
Note, Awarding Attorney's Fees To Environmental Plaintiffs Under a Private Attorney
General Theory, 14 B.C. ENVTL. Arr. L. REv. 287, 290-91 (1987) (same). For more on
the history of English fee shifting practices, see CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES
§ 60 (1935).
69. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247 n.18 (noting that attorney's fees were awarded to
defendants "in all actions where such awards might be made to plaintiffs"); Goodhart,
supra note 68, at 853 (same); King & Plater, supra note 68, at 32 (same).
70. See, eg., Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247 n.18 (explaining that "[i]t is now customary
in England, after litigation of substantive claims has terminated, to conduct separate
hearings before special 'taxing Masters' in order to determine the appropriateness and
the size of an award of counsel fees"); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967) (explaining the role of "taxing Masters" in attorney's fee
awards in England and remarking that allowable fees may even include "the amounts
that may be recovered for letters drafted on behalf of a client"); Goodhart, supra note
68, at 855 (explaining how English courts award attorney's fees and the role of the
taxing Master in awarding those fees).
71. See Jordan, supra note 68, at 291 (explaining that under the English Rule "the
costs of justice should be borne by the losing party because that party imposed the costs
onto the other party by forcing the dispute to be resolved in court").
72. King & Plater, supra note 68, at 32. The prevailing party usually receives all
damages directly caused by the losing party's actions including the costs of litigation.
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liability.73
B. American Rule
Despite the fact that American courts originally paralleled their
English predecessor, American courts have not followed the English
Rule approach.7 4 In 1796, the Supreme Court in Arcambel v. Wise-
man 75 refused to grant a $1600 attorney's fee award. 76 The Arcambel
Court explained that the American judicial system almost always disal-
lowed fee shifting."
American courts continuously deny attorney's fees in most circum-
stances.7 8 In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,79 the
Supreme Court held that, unless specified in an enforceable contract or
written in a statute, successful litigants could not recover attorney's
fees.80 This principle has prevailed and is now well entrenched in
Therefore, courts use their equitable discretion to compensate the prevailing party as if
the losing party's actions and the suit never took place. Id.
73. See Jordan, supra note 68, at 291. The author notes that the English system
"simply requires the losing party to compensate the winning party for its attorney's
fees." Id.
74. See King & Plater, supra note 68, at 33. The authors explain that "the most
intriguing aspect of the relationship of the American and English rules is the fact that
American developments so closely tracked the English model yet ultimately produced
such a different result." Id.
75. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
76. Id
77. Id "The general practice of the United States is in opposition to [attorney's fees
awards unless] it is changed, or modified, by statute." Id.
78. See, e.g., F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S.
116, 127 (1974) (prohibiting recovery of attorney's fees in litigation under the Miller
Act because attorney's fees were not specifically mentioned in the Act nor was there any
evidence of congressional intent to allow such recovery); Fleischmann Distilling Corp.
v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 720 (1967) (holding that counsel fees are not recov-
erable absent express statutorily mandated discretion to award those fees); Stewart v.
Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 197 (1878) (finding that plaintiffs attorney's fees in malicious
prosecution actions are not recoverable); Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 230
(1872) (holding that "[iun actions of trespass where there are no circumstances of aggra-
vation, only compensatory damages can be recovered, and they do not include the fees
of counsel"); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 373 (1851) (disallowing attor-
ney's fees recovery as plaintiffs' compensation or measurement of punitive damages).
79. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
80. Id. at 257 (citing FD. Rich, 417 U.S. at 128-31 and Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4
(1973)). The Alyeska Court explained that "the rule 'has long been that attorney's fees
are not ordinarily recoverable.'" Id. at 257 (quoting Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 717).
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American jurisprudence.8 1 The rationale behind the American Rule is,
because litigation is inherently risky,82 people should not be discour-
aged from participation in the judicial system for fear of both losing
their case and paying their adversaries' costs."3
Although American courts have adhered to the American Rule,
courts have formulated exceptions.8 4 For example, the Supreme Court
in Hall v. Cole 85 recognized that federal courts may exercise their equi-
table powers to award attorney's fees.86 As a result, two equitable ex-
ceptions have developed. First, courts have the power to shift fees
when an adversary acts in bad faith,87 punishing the party for acting
81. See, e.g., Runyan v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 185 (1976) (making it clear that
"absent explicit congressional authorization, attorneys' fees are not a recoverable cost of
litigation"); Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, 766 F. Supp. 335, 338 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(requiring "an explicit statement of congressional intent to shift fees from the successful
plaintiff to the defendant"); T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696,
707 (D.N.J. 1988) (declaring that "it is well-established that a party cannot recover
attorney fees unless provided for by contract or statute").
82. See Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718 (explaining the uncertainty of litigation as
support for the American Rule).
83. Id. The Fleischmann Court reasoned that "one should not be penalized for
merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly discour-
aged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included
the fees of their opponents' counsel." Id.
Another argument in favor of the American Rule is the difficulty in obtaining proof
of costs which, in turn, causes additional judicial and administrative costs. Id. (citing
Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 231 (1872)).
84. Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718.
85. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
86. Id. at 4-5. The Hall Court explained that attorney's fees could be awarded
"when the interests of justice so require" and federal courts have this power as "part of
the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation." Id. at 5
(quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939)). See also King &
Plater, supra note 68, at 38-40 (explaining the origins of equitable exceptions to the
American Rule); Jordan, supra note 68, at 291-92 (same).
87. See, e.g., F.D. Rich Co., Inc. v. United States Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116,
129 (1974) (declaring that "attorneys' fees may be awarded to a successful party when
his opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons");
Hall, 412 U.S. at 5. (same); Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-03
(1968) (affirming a district court award for attorney's fees in a civil rights action due to
a party's bad faith); Toledo Scale v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 427-28 (1923)
(affirming an attorney fee award when a party acted in disrespect to the court); City
Bank v. Rivera Davila, 438 F.2d 1367, 1371 (1st Cir. 1971) (requiring a party who
prolonged a trial to pay opponent's costs). For a general discussion of the bad faith
exception to the American Rule, see generally Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees
for Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C. L. REv. 613 (1983) (comprehensively looking
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reprehensibly. 8 Second, the common benefit exception89 allows a
party to recover attorney's fees when the outcome of the case creates a
fund benefiting an ascertainable class." However, this exception is
limited91 to actions which benefit a class and not the public in gen-
eral. 2 In the late 1960's and early 1970's, courts attempted to create a
private attorney general exception, 93 but the Supreme Court's Alyeska
decision thwarted this attempt by refusing to award attorney's fees un-
less a statute or enforceable contract granted fee shifting authority.94
at fee shifting as a punishment for acting in bad faith). See also King & Plater, supra
note 68, at 39-43; Jordan, supra note 68, at 292-93.
88. See Hall, 412 U.S. at 5. The Hall court explained that in bad faith cases, "the
underlying rationale of 'fee shifting' is, of course, punitive, and the essential element in
triggering the award of fees is therefore the existence of 'bad faith' on the part of the
unsuccessful litigant." Id.
89. Id.
90. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939). In Sprague, the plain-
tiff sued to enforce a bank's fiduciary obligation. kd at 163. The vindication of the
plaintiff's rights necessarily vindicated the rights of many other beneficiaries and credi-
tors who did not participate in the pending litigation. Id. To avoid an unjust enrich-
ment, the court remanded the cost issue in the lower court to address the equitable
concerns in awarding the plaintiffs attorney's fees. Id. at 167.
See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). The Mills Court
awarded attorney's fees to a plaintiff shareholder who prevailed in a derivative action
for violating section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 389-90. The
Court shifted fees because the suit benefitted an ascertainable class and by requiring the
corporation to pay attorney's fees, the loss would spread throughout the benefitted class
of shareholders. Id. at 394-97.
91. Sprague, 307 U.S. at 167 (warning that attorney's fees "allowances are appropri-
ate only in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice").
92. Jordan, supra note 68, at 294. This commentator suggests that if the benefitted
class is too broad and cannot be ascertained, a court cannot properly spread costs;
therefore, the suing party cannot receive attorney's fees. Id.
93. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (ex-
plaining that attorney's fees awards under Title II of the Civil Rights Act would be
awarded to a plaintiff as a "private attorney general" to encourage Civil Rights plaintiffs
to seek judicial relief and enforce congressional purposes); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d
836, 841 (5th Cir. 1972) (permitting an award of attorney's fees under the "private
attorney general" theory); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 147-48
(5th Cir. 1971) (allowing attorney's fees in a civil rights suit under the "private attorney
general" theory). For a history of the private attorney general theory, see Alyeska Pipe-
line Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975) and Jordan, supra note 68.
94. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 257. The Alyeska Court refused to award fees based on a
private attorney general approach unless statutorily given the discretion to do so. Id. at
269. The Alyeska Court explained that without express discretion to shift fees in a
statute, "courts are not free to fashion drastic new rules with respect to the allowance of
attorney's fees to the prevailing party." Id. Some commentators advocate judicial ac-
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As a result, but for a few limited exceptions, American courts will
not award attorney's fees to prevailing litigants.95 Only when a statute
clearly awards attorney's fees to successful litigants will American
courts shift attorney's fees.9 6
IV. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER CERCLA
§ 107(a)(4)(B)
A. Conflicting Authority
Until recently, courts did not directly address97 whether attorney's
fees are recoverable response costs under CERCLA section
107(a)(4)(B). In the past three years, several courts have addressed the
issue and reached contrary results. One line of cases takes a liberal
approach relying on the plain meaning interpretation of
107(a)(4)(B).98 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and various dis-
ceptance of the private attorney general exception. See, e.g., Jordan, Note, supra note
68, at 303-11.
95. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text for cases and discussion concern-
ing the exceptions to fee shifting.
96. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 257 (reaffirming the general rule that, absent statute or
enforceable contract, litigants pay their own attorney's fees).
97. See Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc., v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1452 (S.D.
Fla. 1984). The plaintiffs in Bulk requested an attorney's fee award as well as other
expenses. Id. Although the court refused to allow a section 107(a)(4)(B) action prior to
government authorization of a cleanup plan, the court did not discount the attorney's
fee claim. Id. The court stated that "[o]nce a claimant has begun to implement a gov-
ernment authorized clean-up program, then those preliminary costs heretofore non-re-
coverable (e.g. expenses for legal, architectural, engineering, and other planning) may
be recaptured." Id. This language leaves little doubt that the Bulk court would allow
attorney's fees pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B).
98. See, eg., Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 766 F. Supp. 865, 871 (E.D. Wash.
1991) (finding that attorney's fees are enforcement costs recoverable under CERCLA
section 107); Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 710 (D. Kan. 1991)(hold-
ing that litigation costs that fall within the meaning of "necessary costs" under section
107(a)(4)(B) are recoverable); Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 757 F. Supp. 998, 1006-
07 (D. Minn. 1991)(holding that attorney's fees are recoverable pursuant to section
107(a)(4)(B) because this interpretation of CERCLA's statutory language is consistent
with Congress' purposes in enacting CERCLA). See also General Elec. Co. v. Litton
Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990) (concluding "that
CERCLA authorizes, with a sufficient degree of explicitness, the recovery by private
parties of attorney fees and expenses"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991); Pease &
Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 950 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (finding
that "Congress did intend to allow, and implicitly provided for, the recovery of attor-
ney's fees by private parties as a necessary cost of response"); Shapiro v. Alexanderson,
741 F. Supp. 472, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding that Congress intended for attorney fee
recovery under section 107(a)(4)(B)). General Elec. Co. v. Litton Business Sys., Inc.,
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trict courts have held that attorney's fees are encompassed in CER-
CLA's definition of "response" 99 costs and therefore avoid American
Rule problems. The majority of district courts take a narrower ap-
proach and refuse to award fees because they fail to meet the American
Rule requirements.'" One district court awarded attorney's fees only
to the extent that they are necessary response costs.10'
B. The Liberal Approach
Only one circuit court of appeals has addressed whether attorney's
fees are recoverable under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B). In General
Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems, Inc. ,102 the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a liberal view and allowed
attorney's fees as recoverable response costs.'o 3 Although the General
715 F. Supp. 949, 959 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (General Electric 1) (holding that "CERCLA
specifically allows for the recovery of attorney's fees").
99. See infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text for a discussion concerning
whether attorney's fees fall within the meaning of response costs.
100. See, e.g., New York v. SCA Services, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (stating that "[tihe prevailing rule is that attorney's fees are not recoverable as
response costs in actions under § 107 of CERCLA"); Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk,
No. 89-8644, 1990 WL 52745, at *6 (E.D. Pa. April 13, 1990) (declaring that Congress
did not intend to allow private parties to collect attorney's fees in private cost recovery
actions), reh'g denied, 766 F. Supp. 335, 338 (E.D. Pa. 1991); United States v. Hardage,
750 F. Supp. 1460, 1511 (W.D. Okla. 1990) (following prior district court decisions to
hold that "[a]ttorneys fees and costs of litigation are not recoverable by a private litigant
under CERCLA"); Mesiti v. Microdot Inc., 739 F. Supp. 57, 62-63 (D.N.H. 1990)
(holding that attorney's fees are not recoverable under section 107(a)(4)(B)); In re Hem-
ingway Transp., Inc., 108 B.R. 378, 383 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (same), aff'd, 126 B.R.
656, 663 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991); Regan v. Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D.
R.I. 1989) (agreeing that private party actions may not recover attorney's fees); T & E
Industries v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 707 (D. N.J. 1988) (same as Mesiti).
See also Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 882 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1989). Hanna Mining
involved a cause of action under CERCLA sections 107(a)(4)(C) and 107(0 for natural
resources damages liability. Id. at 393-94. Although these provisions are different than
CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B), the Ninth Circuit court refused to permit an award for
attorney's fees. Id. at 396.
101. See BCW Assoc., Ltd. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., No. 86-5947, 1988 WL
102641, at *22 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1988) (allowing partial recovery for plaintiffs attor-
ney's fees in a CERCLA 107(a) action).
102. 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991).
103. Id. at 1422. The attorney's fees and expenses amounted to more than
$419,000. Id. at 1417. The General Electric court affirmed an award for reasonable
attorney's fees spent for the period before, during, and after filing the suit for response
cost recovery. Id. at 1422. The court upheld the district court's fee allocation as "le-
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Electric court was aware of the American Rule, 104 the court attempted
to find CERCLA's express authorization of attorney's fee awards in
section 107(a)(4)(B).10 5 The General Electric court recognized that
private parties may recover all necessary "response" costs that are
"consistent with the national contingency plan.' ' l ° 6 "Response," as de-
fined by CERCLA, includes removal and remedial actions and all re-
lated enforcement actions.107 Thus, the General Electric court
interpreted section 107(a)(4)(B) as an enforcement action °s and con-
cluded that attorney's fees, as necessary expenses in an enforcement
action, clearly fell into "response" costs. ° 9 Furthermore, the General
Electric court exercised its discretion to shift fees to the prevailing
plaintiffs. 1 The court explained that awarding private party attor-
ney's fees pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B) is consistent with CER-
CLA's purposes."'1 Moreover, the General Electric court feared that a
gaily correct and reasonable." Id. See General Elec. Co. v. Litton Business Sys., 715 F.
Supp. 949, 954-55 (W.D. Mo. 1989) for the district court's attorney fee allocation.
104. 920 F.2d at 1421 (stating that the "general rule is that 'the prevailing litigant is
ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser'" (quoting
Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975))).
105. 920 F.2d at 1421. The General Electric court explained that because of the
American Rule, "in order to uphold an award of attorney fees, we look to the language
of CERCLA." Id. "We must find more than 'generalized commands;' there must be a
clear expression of Congress' intent." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Runyan v. Mc-
Crary, 427 U.S. 160, 186 (1976)).
106. 920 F.2d at 1421. See CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)
(1988).
107. CERCLA § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988) defines "respond" or "re-
sponse" as: "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action; all such terms (including
the terms 'removal' and 'remedial action') include enforcement activities related
thereto."
108. General Elec., 920 F.2d at 1422. The court found that a "private party cost-
recovery action such as this one is an enforcement activity within the meaning of the
statute." (citing Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691,
694 (9th Cir. 1988) and Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
109. Id. at 1422. The court held that "it would strain the statutory language to the
breaking point to read [attorney's fees] out of the 'necessary costs' that section
9607(a)(4)(B) allows private parties to recover." Id.
110. Id. The General Electric court properly took advantage of the statutory excep-
tion to the American Rule and shifted fees to the defendant. See supra notes 79-82 and
accompanying text for cases discussing the statutory exception to the American Rule.
111. General Elec., 920 F.2d at 1422. Awarding attorney's fees "based on [CER-
CLA's] statutory language is consistent with two of the main purposes of CERCLA -
prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and imposition of all cleanup costs on the
responsible party." Id. See also notes 34-35 and accompanying text for cases discussing
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refusal to award attorney's fees would create a disincentive to clean up
hazardous substance sites.112
The liberal line of cases following the General Electric approach
awards attorney's fees based on CERCLA's remedial purpose and
plain language. These courts agree that Congress intended to give
CERCLA a broad interpretation in order to avoid restricting responsi-
ble party liability. 113 In addition, the General Electric approach bases
its conclusion that attorney's fees are necessary' 14 costs to enforce
CERCLA's rehedial goals 15 on the plain statutory meaning of "re-
sponse."1 16 These courts reason that forcing responsible parties to pay
the impact of legislative intent on the shifting of fees in action brought pursuant to
CERCLA.
112. 920 F.2d at 1422. The General Electric court explained that CERCLA's "pur-
poses would be undermined if a non-polluter (such as GE) were forced to absorb the
litigation costs of recovering its response costs from the polluter." Id. It continued to
explain that the "litigation costs could easily approach or even exceed the response
costs, thereby serving as a disincentive to clean the site." Id.
Some have argued that General Electric should be read as a clean-hands case and
should be limited accordingly. See, e.g., Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 766 F.
Supp. 865, 872 n.3 (1991). In Key Tronic, the court refused to limit General Electric in
this manner. The court stated that it "cannot find a statutory basis to justify an analyti-
cal distinction between those who have clean hands and bring a cost recovery action and
those who do not." Id.
113. See, e.g., Key Tronic, 766 F. Supp. at 871 (holding that courts should read
CERCLA broadly to permit recovery and hold wrongdoers responsible); General Elec.
Co. v. Litton Business Sys., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 949, 959 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (finding that
congressional intent dictates that courts give CERCLA "broad interpretation so as not
to restrict the liability of those responsible parties" (citing United States v. Northeastern
Pharm. & Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823, 852 (W.D. Mo. 1984))), aff'd, 920 F.2d
1415 (8th Cir. 1990), cerl denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991); Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 741
F. Supp. 472, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same); Pease & Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab,
Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 951 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (same).
114. See General Elec. Co. v. Litton Business Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th
Cir. 1990) (explaining that "[a]ttorney fees and expenses necessarily are incurred in this
kind of enforcement activity and it would strain the statutory language to the breaking
point to read them out of the 'necessary costs' that section 9607(a)(4)(B) allows private
parties to recover"), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1390 (1991).
115. See Pease & Curren Ref Co., 744 F. Supp. at 951. The Pease & Curren court
explained that:
Congress intended for 'enforcement activities' to include attorney's fees expended
to induce a responsible party to comply with the remedial actions mandated by
CERCLA. This court cannot ascertain any other logical interpretation which
would give effect to this phrase. If this court were to rule otherwise, the phrase
"enforcement activities" would be superfluous.
Id.
116. See supra note 107 and accompanying text for the CERCLA definition of"re-
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for legal costs incurred to clean up hazardous substance sites effectu-
ates CERCLA's basic purposes.
117
C. The Narrow Approach
Two recent cases represent the narrow approach to attorney fee re-
covery under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B). District courts in T & E
Industries, Inc. v. Safety Light Corp."' and Fallowfield Development
Corp. v. Strunk 119 concluded that attorney's fees were not recoverable
response costs. 120 Bound by the American Rule, both courts searched
for an attorney's fee provision within CERCLA's statutory lan-
guage.1 2 Neither court interpreted an action under section
107(a)(4)(B) to be an "enforcement" action.122 Both courts found that
because section 107(a)(4)(B) is not an "enforcement action," private
parties cannot incur the enforcement cost that CERCLA contem-
plates. 123 The Fallowfield court went one step further and interpreted
sponse." See also Shapiro, 741 F. Supp. at 480 (interpreting CERCLA's definition of
"response" to include reasonable attorney's fees expended on receiving compensation
for response costs); Pease & Curren, 744 F. Supp. at 951 (same).
117. See General Elea, 920 F.2d at 1422 (finding one of CERCLA's purposes to be
"imposition of all cleanup costs on the responsible party").
118. 680 F. Supp. 696 (D.N.J. 1988).
119. No. 89-8644, 1990 WL 52745 (E.D. Pa. 1991), rehg denied, 766 F. Supp. 335
(E.D. Pa. 1991).
120. T & E Indus. 680 F. Supp. at 707 (declaring that "[u]pon careful review...
this Court finds no indication that attorney fees and costs of litigation are recoverable
by a private litigant"); Fallowfield, 1990 WL 52745, at *6 (stating that Congress "did
not intend to allow private parties to collect attorneys' fees in private cost recovery
actions").
121. T & E Indus., 680 F. Supp. at 707; Fallowfield, 1990 WL 52745, at *5.
122. Similar to the General Electric court, both of these courts began with CER-
CLA section 107(a)(4)(B) and focused on the word "response." T & E Indus., 680 F.
Supp. at 705; Fallowfield, 1990 WL 52745, at *6. Both courts then moved to CERCLA
section 101(25) and noted that "response" includes "all enforcement activities related
thereto." T & E Indus., 680 F. Supp. at 705; Fallowfield, 1990 WL 52945, at *6. The
disagreement among courts centers on their interpretation of whether section
107(a)(4)(B) is an "enforcement" action.
123. T & E Indus., 680 F. Supp. at 708 n.13. The T & E Industries court explained
that although "plaintiffs may bring an action for recovery of response costs, they may
not bring an action to enforce CERCLA's cleanup provisions against another private
entity. Thus, private parties do not incur 'enforcement costs' as contemplated by CER-
CLA." Id. See also Fallowfield, 1990 WL 52745, at *6 (same). But see General Elec.
Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding
a private party recovery action to be an enforcement activity under CERCLA); Pease &
Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 951 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (holding
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the 1986 SARA amendments as an expression of congressional intent
to exclude private party attorney fee recovery under section
107(a)(4)(B). 2 4 The Fallowfield court relied upon comments 125 by the
Committee on Energy and Commerce in determining the meaning of
"response" in section 101 and concluded that "response" applies only
to governmental recovery of enforcement costs. 126 This confirmed the
Fallowfield court's belief that "enforcement" means "government
cleanup enforcement" and not private party cost recovery actions.
127
The rationale behind the narrow approach is strict adherence to the
American Rule and refusal to read section 107(a)(4)(B) broadly.'
28
These courts would certainly grant attorney fee awards for government
that a section 107(a)(4)(B) action is an enforcement action within the meaning of
CERCLA).
124. Fallowfield, 1990 WL 52745, at *6 (finding that "the legislative history of the
SARA amendments reveals that Congress did not intend private parties to recover at-
torneys' fees in cost recovery actions"). For a comprehensive discussion of the 1986
SARA amendments, see generally Holman, supra note 2.
125. 1990 WL 52745, at *6. The court relied on comments made by the Committee
on Energy and Commerce. Id.
126. Id. The court relied upon H.R. Rep. No. 235, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67
(1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2848-49. Id. The comments explain that
section 101 "modifies the definition of 'response action' to include related enforcement
activities. The change will confirm the EPA's authority to recover costs for enforce-
ment actions taken against responsible parties." Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 235). The
court in Fallowfield restricted "enforcement activities" to actions to collect government
response costs under 107(a)(4)(A) after a cleanup under section 104. 1990 WL 52745, at
*6. The court refused to extend the same reasoning to private party response cost re-
covery actions under 107(a)(4)(B). Id.
See also Regan v. Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145 (D.R.I. 1989). In Regan, the court
refused to award attorney's fees pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B) because Congress
failed to specifically allow attorney's fees when Congress amended CERCLA through
the 1986 SARA amendments. Id. at 149. The court in Regan explained that:
If Congress had intended to permit citizens seeking response costs to recover their
attorney fees, it would simply have amended § 107 to allow the recovery of these
litigation costs. SARA was a comprehensive overhaul of CERCLA. Therefore it
would have been a [sic] simply matter to amend § 107 to allow the recovery of
attorney fees.
Id.
127. Fallowfield, 1990 WL 52745, at *6. The Fallowfield court would award gov-
ernmental attorney's fee awards under section 107(a)(4)(A). See supra note 40 and ac-
companying text for an explanation of government attorney fee recovery under
CERCLA.
128. See T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 708 (D.N.J.




contribution actions under section 107(a)(4)(A).' 29 Moreover, these
courts concur that governmental cleanup responses are clearly "en-
forcement" actions which allow reimbursement of all necessary costs
that are not inconsistent with the NCP.13 0 However, the narrow line
rejects the proposition that a private party response cost recovery ac-
tion is an "enforcement activity."' 131 The refusal to define section
107(a)(4)(B) actions as "enforcement" actions inevitably leads to pre-
clusion of attorney's fees under the American Rule.1 32
V. ANALYSIS
A. Awarding Attorney's Fees in CERCLA Section 107(a)(4)(B) is
Consistent with the American Rule.
The American Rule disallowing attorney's fees unless authorized in
an enforceable contract or statute is a well-founded principle, requiring
strict adherence.' 3 3 Courts must find express congressional authoriza-
tion in CERCLA in order to award attorney's fees. 134 Clearly, the
government may recover litigation costs in 107(a)(4)(A) actions after
initiating site cleanups pursuant to section 104(a). 3 1 Specific language
in section 104(b) grants authority for governmental attorney fee recov-
129. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text for an explanation of the govern-
mental cause of action under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(A) and governmental attorney
fee recovery. See also T & E Indus., Inc., 680 F. Supp. at 707-08 (explaining that the
government is allowed to receive attorney's fees under CERCLA section 104(b)); Fal-
lowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, No. 89-8644, 1990 WL 52745, at *5 (E.D. Pa. April 23,
1990) (stating that legal fees "were specifically provided for in actions by the govern-
ment" (citing United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 597 F. Supp. 823
(W.D. Mo. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986))).
130. See supra note 47 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the NCP.
131. See Fallowfield, 1990 WL 52745, at *6 (stating that "enforcement activities"
do not include private party recovery of attorney's fees in an action for private cost
recovery).
132. Id.
133. See supra notes 74-96 for a discussion of the American Rule and its statutory
and contractual exceptions.
134. See General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., 920 F.2d 1415, 1421
(8th Cir. 1990) (finding that Congress must clearly express its intent in CERCLA in
order to uphold an award of attorney's fees).
135. See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp.
823, 851 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (allowing governmental attorney fee recovery in a CERCLA
section 107(a)(4)(A) action after incurring response costs pursuant to section 104(a)),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987). See supra note 41 for a discussion and list of cases which grant attorney's fees to
the government.
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
276 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 42:251
ery.136 CERCLA's private response cost recovery provision similarly
allows private party litigation cost recovery pursuant to a section
107(a)(4)(B) action.137 Section 107(a)(4)(B)'s plain language coupled
with CERCLA's definition of "response" expressly permits attorney
fee recovery and prevents any American Rule problems. 138
1. Private Causes of Action Pursuant to § 107(a)(4)(B) are
Enforcement Actions.
Private parties may recover all "response" costs necessarily incurred
that are consistent with the NCP. 139 CERCLA's definition of "re-
sponse" includes all enforcement activities related to the response. 140
The central question in deciding attorney fee recovery pursuant to a
section 107(a)(4)(B) action is whether a private party response cost ac-
tion is an "enforcement" action.1 41  Courts which examine section
107(a)(4)(B) actions in light of CERCLA's broad remedial purpose 42
should conclude that response activities are enforcement actions. Pri-
vate cost recovery actions enforce CERCLA's objective of expeditious
hazardous waste cleanup and place ultimate liability on the party re-
sponsible for creating the danger.1 43 As a result, effective private en-
forcement mechanisms promote congressional goals underlying
136. See CERCLA § 104(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (1988). See also supra note 41 for
the pertinent text of section 104(b).
137. See supra note 7 and accompanying text for the language of CERCLA
§ 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
138. At least one commentator argues that attorney's fees are not recoverable under
CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B). Kanad S. Virk, Comment, General Elec Co. v. Litton Indus.
Automation Systems, Inc: Are Attorneys Fees Recoverable in CERCLA Private Cost Re-
covery Actions?, 75 MINN. L. R-v. 1541 (1991).
139. See CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
140. See supra note 107 and accompanying text for CERCLA's definition of
"response."
141. This is the key difference between the liberal approach illustrated in General
Electric (see supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text) and the narrow approach fol-
lowed in T & E Industries (see supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text).
142. Courts have almost uniformly interpreted CERCLA liberally. See supra note
33 for a list of cases broadly interpreting CERCLA.
143. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of CERCLA's
objectives. Forcing an innocent party to pay litigation costs resulting from the hazard-
ous waste disposer's actions hinder CERCLA's goal of ultimate liability. See supra note
111 and accompanying text for the General Electric court's view that ultimate liability is




Courts which attempt to separate government enforcement actions
from private cost recovery actions hinder congressional objectives un-
derlying CERCLA. By refusing to classify section 107(a)(4)(B) actions
as enforcement actions, these courts define "enforcement actions" as
"governmental hazardous substance site cleanup responses," 145 yet
give no reason for choosing a restrictive definition of "enforcement."
The plain meaning of "enforcement" is an action to further a command
or effectuate something such as a law. 146 Common sense dictates that
governmental cleanup responses are not the sole acts that take effect
under CERCLA. Both governmental cleanups and private party
cleanups achieve the same result147 of furthering congressional objec-
tives. When a private party sues a responsible party for response cost
recovery, the private party should logically wear the same shoes as the
government and recover attorney's fees.
House Commission reports do not overcome CERCLA's plain
meaning. A House report mentioning that "enforcement" within
CERCLA section 101(25) confirms the EPA's right to collect enforce-
ment costs pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(A) does not effectively end the
attorney fees inquiry. The House Report simply guides governmental
authorities involved in hazardous substance site clean up. This gui-
dance is consistent with CERCLA's general framework as a reference
for government responses. 148 If Congress intended to apply two sepa-
rate definitions of "response," one for the government and one for pri-
vate parties, Congress would have expressly indicated this intention in
144. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text for an explanation of how an
effective private cause of action promotes CERCLA's objectives.
145. See supra note 123 and accompanying text for a sample of cases which nar-
rowly interpret the meaning of a CERCLA enforcement action.
146. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 275 (5th ed. 1983) (defining enforcement as "[t]he
act of putting something such as a law into effect; the execution of a law; the carrying
out of a mandate or command").
147. This author asserts that there is one less hazardous substance site in the world
regardless of whether the government or a private party cleaned up that site.
148. When Congress first enacted CERCLA, courts were unsure as to whether a
private cause of action existed. See supra note 42 for cases in which courts denied that a
private cause of action exists under CERCLA. This uncertainty exists because the lan-
guage of CERCLA is sometimes unclear due to its quick passage and compromising
nature. See supra notes 21 & 32 for a discussion of this proposition. The 1980 House
Reports and 1986 SARA Amendments focused more on governmental cleanup authori-
zation than private party cleanup actions. Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,
589 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (W.D. Fla. 1984). The Bulk court pointed out that "[w]ith
Congress' attention focused on government involvement in waste site cleanup, it comes
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CERCLA. 4 9 The SARA amendments added the "enforcement" lan-
guage in the general definition section 101 of CERCLA, which applies
to both governmental and private party causes of action under section
107(a).' 50 Had Congress intended to apply "enforcement activities"
merely to governmental parties, Congress could have instead placed
the amendment in section 104, which applies only to governmental
parties. 5 ' The only logical definition of "response" encompasses pri-
vate party 107(a)(4)(B) actions as "enforcement activities."' 5 2 There-
fore, CERCLA's plain language requires courts to interpret
107(a)(4)(B) actions as enforcement actions1 53 and not limit the defini-
tion of "enforcement." As enforcement actions, 107(a)(4)(B) actions
by private parties are statutorily defined response costs, capable of re-
covery from responsible parties.
2. Attorney Fee Awards Are Consistent with the NCP
For response cost recovery pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B), the cost
as no surprise that those portions of CERCLA's text and legislative history discussing a
private party's rights against other private parties ... are ill-defined." Id.
CERCLA was originally designed to guide governmental authorities and does not
provide much guidance for private parties. See supra note 48 for a discussion of Con-
gress' guiding purposes in passing CERCLA.
149. See Pease & Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 951 (C.D.
Cal. 1990) (mentioning that "Congress has not expressly limited the definitions set forth
in 101(25) to federal parties").
150. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Litton
Indus. Automation Sys., Inc. v. General Elec. Co., in Hazardous Waste Litigation Re-
porter 10, March 18, 1991. [hereinafter Brief]. See also Key Tronic Corp. v. United
States, 766 F. Supp. 865, 871 (E.D. Wash. 1991) ("Congress drafted section 101(25) to
establish the scope of response costs recoverable throughout CERCLA; thus, the defini-
tion of response, on its face, applies to both the Government and private parties.").
151. Brief, supra note 150, at 11. See also supra notes 35-40 for an explanation of
the governmental cause of action under CERCLA.
152. In Regan v. Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D. R.I. 1989), the court
disallowed attorney's fees because Congress failed to specifically provide for attorney's
fees awards when it passed the 1986 SARA amendments. See supra note 127 for the
relevant text of Regan. It should be kept in mind, however, that the 107(a)(4)(B) attor-
ney fee case law had yet to develop when Congress promulgated the SARA amend-
ments. See Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 757 F. Supp. 998, 1006 n.5 (D. Minn.
1991) (explaining that "Congress may not have been aware that courts would interpret
CERCLA as disallowing the recovery of attorneys' fees").
153. See Pease & Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 951 (C.D.
Cal. 1990). The court in Pease & Curren correctly explained that it was "bound by the
plain language of the text and will not take it upon itself to so limit the statute." Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol42/iss1/17
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must be necessarily incurred and consistent with the NCP. 1 54 A party
intending to clean up a hazardous substance site must hire an exper-
ienced attorney.'55 Therefore, legal costs are reasonably included as
necessary response costs. 1 56 Congress purposely defined NCP consis-
tency in an open-ended fashion in order to prevent rigid adherence to
unbending requirements157 and promote private party cleanups pursu-
ant to section 107(a)(4)(B).' 58 So long as the cleanup itself substan-
tially complies with NCP requirements and results in a CERCLA-
quality cleanup,' 59 a court cannot refuse attorney fee recovery for a
practice inconsistent with the NCP.
B. Fee Shifting is Consistent with CERCLA's Purposes.
As previously mentioned, CERCLA's two basic purposes are
prompt hazardous substance site removal and ultimate liability forced
upon the party responsible for creating the danger.)" Attorney fee
awards are consistent with both of these general policies. In addition,
the guarantee of attorney's fees to prevailing parties creates an incen-
tive to litigate claims and clean up hazardous substance sites. 61 Attor-
154. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
155. Hiring an attorney is necessary if a PRP wants to clean up a hazardous sub-
stance site. See supra note 71 and accompanying text for an explanation of the theory
underlying fee shifting. Environmental suits can be very complex and filled with legal
maneuvering. "Dean S. Sommer, New York's assistant attorney general for hazardous
waste prosecution... says the $600,000 cleanup of a small waste-oil storage site in New
York generated more than 30 depositions, 200 pleadings, and five years of fighting by
law firms . . . ." Marianne Lavella, Setting Sites on Superfund, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 18,
1991, at 37.
156. See supra note 114 for a discussion of a court's approach in viewing legal
expenses as "necessary."
157. See supra note 57 and accompanying text for a discussion of actions that are
consistent with the NCP.
158. See supra note 60 for an explanation of how broad interpretations of NCP
consistency promote private party cleanups.
159. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text for an explanation of applicable
cleanup regulations and the definition of "CERCLA-quality cleanup."
160. General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422
(8th Cir. 1990).
161. Usually, federal courts frown upon incentives to litigate claims. However, this
was precisely the purpose underlying CERCLA. Prior to CERCLA's enactment, aban-
doned hazardous substance sites were not adequately dealt with. See supra notes 22-28
and accompanying text for a discussion of the inadequacy of CERCLA's predecessor
statute and the need to increase litigation to cleanup abandoned hazardous waste sites.
Congress intended to create avenues to clean up these sites. Courts and the EPA have
consistently stated that CERCLA's private cause of action is necessary to promote vol-
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neys will also litigate more fervently if the party seeking litigation has a
strong case. 162 On the other hand, refusing to award attorney's fees
creates a disincentive to litigate. 163 Most importantly, fee shifting pro-
motes congressional objectives of forcing liability on persons responsi-
ble for hazardous substance disposal.' 64 Parties which litigate
pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B) recover completely while the party
disposing hazardous waste is completely liable for the resulting
damages. 165
C. Fee Shifting Could Serve as a Deterrent Against Hazardous
Substance Disposal and May Prevent Unnecessary Delay.
A stronger private enforcement mechanism makes it easier to re-
cover response costs. Clearly, courts and the EPA need to act consist-
ently to prevent needless or difficult obstacles to a successful private
party response cost recovery.1 66 Attorney's fee awards prevent poten-
tially responsible parties from safely hiding behind an innocent party's
fear of the immense costs involved in response cost recovery litigation.
For responsible parties, hazardous substance disposal costs have risen,
which could lead to more effective hazardous substance disposal. If the
untary cleanups without significant obstacles. See supra notes 60 & 66 and accompany-
ing text for support for this proposition. Disallowing attorney's fees is an unnecessary
obstacle to private party cleanups.
Awarding attorney's fees can also save the government money. Allowing attorney's
fees strengthens private enforcement mechanisms creating incentives for private parties
to litigate directly against PRPs. This saves the government the time, effort, and money
that it would expend if a party sought reimbursement from the Superfund pursuant to
section 11 l(a)(2). See supra note 66 and accompanying text for a further explanation of
the limited finances in Superfund available to the government for enforcement actions
under CERCLA.
162. This author believes that the plaintiff bringing an enforcement action can easily
gain legal counsel because that counsel is guaranteed payment of a reasonable fee under
a fee shifting scheme.
163. See supra note 112 explaining that there is no incentive for legal counsel to
take CERCLA cases if no fee shifting statute exists.
164. See supra note 35 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress' intent
of placing ultimate liability on the party disposing of hazardous waste.
165. This is the English Rule rationale applied to CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B).
See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text for a further explanation of the rationale
underlying the English Rule.
166. Courts currently take either a liberal or conservative view in determining
whether to award attorney's fees under CERCLA. See supra note 33 for a list of cases




price for hazardous substance disposal skyrockets, potential polluters
will think twice before engaging in environmental abuse. This deter-
rent effect is consistent with congressional concerns about environmen-
tal indifference prior to CERCLA's enactment.1 67
Attorney's fee awards could also prevent needless delays and hard-
ball tactics used by PRP defendants in a CERCLA plaintiff's cost re-
covery action. Defendants resorting to such tactics will only be
hurting themselves by paying higher cost recovery bills. By preventing
unnecessary delays, section 107(a)(4)(B) actions will be more effective
and will ultimately promote private party cleanup efforts. 161
VI. CONCLUSION
For the first time, courts have struggled with the issue of whether
private parties may recover attorney's fees as necessary response costs
pursuant to CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B). Courts answering this
question have examined CERCLA's language, under the American
Rule direction, and have reached opposite results concerning the is-
sue."'6 9 The minority of courts have properly concluded that attorney's
fees are recoverable.
CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B) allows prevailing party attorney fee
recovery. Section 107(a)(4)(B) actions are enforcement actions and
therefore qualify as recoverable response costs. 7 ° This conclusion is
consistent with CERCLA's broad remedial purpose to promptly clean
up hazardous substance sites at the expense of responsible parties.171
Courts must keep congressional objectives in mind and construe CER-
CLA liberally to promote them. Awarding attorney's fees pursuant to
section 107(a)(4)(B) actions effectuates congressional purposes and
helps strengthen private enforcement mechanisms. Courts that ignore
CERCLA's plain language and refuse to allow attorney's fees weaken
CERCLA and shift the blame to the American Rule. Instead, courts
167. See supra notes 33-34 for a discussion of CERCLA's general purposes.
168. See supra notes 65-66 explaining that Congress intented to prevent barriers to
section 107(a)(4)(B) private causes of action.
169. See supra note 98 for a list of decisions in which courts awarded attorney's fees
and note 100 for a list of decisions in which courts refused to award attorney's fees.
170. See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of why CER-
CLA section 107(A)(4)(B) actions are enforcement actions within the meaning of
CERCLA.
171. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress'
intentions in passing CERCLA.
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must recognize CERCLA's express language and allow private parties
to recover attorney's fees as authorized in section 107(a)(4)(B).
Eric D. Kaplan*
* J.D. 1992, Washington University.
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